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Abstract—There is a growing interest in solutions relying on
the identifier/locator separation paradigm. It introduces several
benefits in terms of scalability and flexibility. It relies on two
addressing spaces, namely the identifiers, for endpoint identifi-
cation, and the locators, for packet forwarding. An additional
control plane is necessary to map one space to the other.
In this paper, we explore how control messages can be an
amplification vector for DoS attacks. We evaluate the possible
amplification factor based on a real deployment, showing that
the amplification factor exists. We also build a GNS-3 testbed to
demonstrate further and analyze the attack.
Index Terms—LISP, Mapping System, Amplification, IP Spoof-
ing, DoS
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both academia and industry have explored
ways to enhance the Internet Architecture [1], with ongoing
efforts imagining the Internet ten years from now [2], [3].
One of the cornerstones retained to achieve such a goal is to
leverage on the locator/identifier separation paradigm because
of the benefits and flexibility such an approach introduces in
the hourglass architecture of the Internet [4], [5].
The locator/identifier separation paradigm relies on the
existence of two different address types: the identifiers and the
locators. An identifier is used to identify a connection endpoint
and is only locally routable. In contrast, a locator refers to a
node attachment point in the Internet topology and is globally
routable. In order to perform data plane operations, it is
necessary to be able to associate identifiers with locators. Thus,
an indirection mechanism is necessary, binding identifiers to
locators or, stated differently, gluing the identifier addressing
space to the locator addressing space. Such an indirection
mechanism is generally named a Mapping Distribution System
(MDS), which is queried in an on-demand fashion, similarly
to the DNS system.
This paper addresses an important issue in the loca-
tor/identifier separation paradigm, notably the (ab)use of the
MDS control messages as an amplification vector for a denial-
of-service attack. The principle of such a kind of attack is quite
simple and somewhat equivalent to the DNS amplification
attack [6]: the attacker forges a message (the source IP
address being spoofed with the one of the targeted victim),
for querying the MDS to get locators associated to identifiers.
Politely, the MDS replies to the victim, with a set of locators,
this message being possibly larger than the one sent by the
attacker. With the appropriate level of bandwidth, the attacker
has the potential to drown the victim with undesired messages.
This paper makes the following contribution. We use LISP
(Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol [7]) as a tool to obtain
a realistic evaluation. We build a GNS-3 simulated testbed for
demonstrating the attack. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to showcase locator/identifier separation attacks.
Previous work on LISP has mainly tackled the evaluation
of the performance of LISP [8], [9], neglecting addressing
security issues. Some work has also focused on the use of LISP
as actually a mechanism to mitigate some non-LISP related
DDoS attacks [10], [11] Some proposals focused specifically
on the LISP data plane confidentiality [12], [13], extending
LISP to allow protecting data exchange.
Concerning the LISP MDS, there has been quite some
work on how to secure it to provide origin authentication and
secure communication [14], [15], or integrity and anti-replay
protection [16]. Saucez et al. [17], explored the security threats
applicable to the whole LISP architecture, also providing
recommendations to make the whole LISP infrastructure more
robust. They are the first to conjecture the possibility of an
amplification attack leveraging on the MDS. Nevertheless,
except for a basic calculation of theoretical amplification
factor, no analysis whatsoever has been carried out, no details
are provided on how to realize the attack in the context of
LISP–DDT, and proof-of-concept attack has been carried out,
which are the main contributions of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
provides the necessary background on LISP; Sec. III provides a
proof-of-concept of the attack based on GNS-3; finally, Sec. IV
concludes this paper by summarizing its main achievements.
II. LISP BACKGROUND
In order to provide an overview on LISP, we first show how
the LISP data plane (i.e., packet forwarding) works (Sec. II-1),
before describing the LISP control plane (Sec. II-2).
1) LISP Data Plane: The Locator/IDentifier Separation
Protocol (LISP) [7] separates the identification and localization
roles of IP addresses by introducing two logical addressing
spaces: (i) the Routing LOCator space (RLOC), which is
globally routable; (ii) the Endpoint IDentifier space (EID),
which is only locally routable and whose main purpose is to
identify the communication endpoint. With this separation, the
Internet core, also known as Default Free Zone (DFZ), handles
RLOCs addresses like it is done today, i.e., maintaining routes
so that packets can be forwarded between any router within
the DFZ. Stub networks instead use the EID addressing space.
The implication of such a separation lies in stub networks
not needing anymore a full knowledge of the Internet routing
information, whereby the DFZ does not need anymore to ad-
vertise the EID space in its routing infrastructure. Nonetheless,
in order to provide end-to-end communication, another level
of indirection is required.
The LISP data plane provides this level of indirection
through a tunneling mechanism over the DFZ. More specif-
ically, any communicating host generates regular IP packets
using its EID as the source address and the destination EID
as the destination address. Forwarding towards the border
router is done as usual in the local domain. The border router,
now called Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), will encapsulate the
packets using the RLOC addressing space, i.e., using its RLOC
address as the source address and the destination RLOC as
the destination address in the tunnel header encapsulating the
original packet [7]. The encapsulated packets can now be
forwarded over the DFZ. The border router at the destination
site, now called Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), will decapsulate
the LISP packets so that the original packet can be forwarded
to its final EID destination.
2) LISP Control Plane: In order to perform the data plane
operations, tunnel routers need to be able to associate EIDs
to RLOCs. The binding between the two addressing spaces is
named mapping. A mapping enables a tunnel router (generally
referred to as an xTR) to retrieve the RLOCs associated to a
given EID, to be used in the outer header when encapsulating.
Mappings are stored in two data structures present on xTRs: (i)
the LISP Database storing the mappings for EID prefixes for
which the xTR itself is an RLOC; (ii) the LISP Cache storing
mappings for EID prefixes used in ongoing communication
towards/from distant LISP sites.
In addition, the LISP control plane relies on a pull model,
i.e., pulling routing information on xTRs only when actually
needed. The key point of this approach is how to make routing
information available on an on-demand fashion? To this end,
the LISP control plane introduces a Mapping Distribution
System (MDS) providing a lookup infrastructure from where
mappings can be retrieved upon an explicit query.
From an abstract point of view, the MDS works as follows.
The ITR that needs a mapping for a new flow first sends a
query, consisting of a Map-Request message to a Map-
Resolver (MR) [18]. The query is forwarded by the Map-
Resolver inside the MDS according to the specific proto-
col/architecture used, to reach the Map-Server (MS) where the
site using the requested EID has registered the mapping. The
Map-Server then forwards the query to the xTR that registered
such a mapping. In turn, the xTR will send the reply, consisting
of a Map-Reply message containing the requested mapping,
directly to the ITR that, in the first place, sent the query. The
Map-Resolver and Map-Server elements represent respectively
where to ask for a mapping and where to register a mapping
so as to make it available to other LISP sites. They provide
a general front-end for any mapping system, “hiding” the
specific MDS in use to the LISP tunnel routers.




























































Fig. 1. GNS-3 testbed and illustration of the steps of the amplification attack.
is the MDS used in the experimental LISP Beta Network [20]
and, as such, is the subject of this paper. LISP–DDT is a
DNS-like system with a hierarchy of LISP–DDT Servers,
as illustrated in the top part of Fig. 1. When a mapping
must be retrieved for a given EID, a root server (ddt-root
in Fig. 1) is queried first. By definition, a root server is
responsible for the entire EID space, which is divided into
several portions, each one being managed by one of the Top-
Level Domain (ddt-tld* in Fig. 1). The root replies with
a pointer (i.e., a referral) to its children responsible for the
EID prefix to resolve. The process is recursively repeated
with the returned child considered as the root of the sub-tree,
where a mapping for the EID can be retrieved. This recursive
process is stopped when a leaf has been reached. In LISP–
DDT, leaves are made of Map-Servers (*-mrms in Fig. 1).
Each Map-Server maintains a list of ETR authoritative for the
different EID prefixes registered to it (at least one matching
the requested EID). Thus, when the leaf has been reached,
the mapping is retrieved by sending a Map-Request to one
of the ETR authoritative for the matching EID prefix. The
ETR, will generate the corresponding Map-Reply, containing
the requested mapping, and send it directly to the ITR who
originally sent out the Map-Request.
III. LISP & AMPLIFICATION ATTACKS
In the context of LISP, a Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-
tack works in a similar way in DNS: the attacker forges
Map-Request, with the source address being spoofed with
the victim address (this is possible, as lots of ISPs still allow
IP spoofing [21]). The MDS will reply with Map-Reply
messages destined to the victim. If Map-Reply packets are
large enough, it has the potential to drown the victim (and
possibly part of the victim LISP network).
We actually realize the amplification attack’s proof-of-
concept, relying on the LISP MDS. Simulations are run based
(a) Received data on victim’s side.
(b) CPU overload on victim’s side.
Fig. 2. Effects of the DoS attack on the victim.
on GNS-3, an emulator in a virtualized router.1 Our simula-
tions are based on the LISP Beta Network [20]. Since March
2012, the LISP Beta Network uses LISP–DDT as Mapping
System [22]. Participants in the LISP Beta Network are located
in 27 different countries, mostly in Europe and USA, and con-
sist of both academic institutions and companies. The LISP–
DDT hierarchy of the testbed is composed of nine servers
composing a three-level topology. The root (ddt-root) is
made of one server running in the USA and reachable via
anycast addresses. The hierarchy is composed of only one
level below the root, composed of two Top-Level Domains
(ddt-tld*), also reachable in anycast. Below them, there
are six MS/MR servers (*-mrms) implementing the front-
end through which the MDS can be queried. We replicated
such topology with GNS-3, as shown in Fig. 1, where their
name can clearly identify servers’ roles. To emulate the
deployment mentioned above in our physical testbed, we used
four servers organized in two subnets with two servers each.
Both subnets are connected through a link with a bottleneck of
4Mbits/sec. One of the servers in the first subnet is in charge
of the MDS (LISP–DDT on Fig. 1), implemented with GNS-3
running Cisco IOS C7200 image.2 One of the servers in the
second subnet is also running GNS-3 and simulates routers
in the Internet (DFZ, US, . . . on Fig. 1), as well as the EID
space. The remaining servers are dedicated, respectively, to the
attacker and the victim and are running as dockers on Debian.
1) Amplification Attack in LISP: The attack itself works in
four steps, represented by red arrows in Fig. 1:
Step 1: The attacker crafts Map-Request messages for
the EID prefix of us-site1-xtr. Those messages rely on
1See https://gns3.com/
2We run GNS-3 on Virtual PC Simulator, a lightweight operating system.
spoofing, which is possible due to insecure operators [21]. In
the Outer header, the attacker will specify, as the destination,
any available Map-Server (here upc-mrms) and its own IP
address as the source.
Step 2: The forged Map-Request is sent to a Map-Server
(upc-mrms in Fig. 1). The Map-Request will be forwarded
to a Map-Server associated with us-site1 (eqx-mrms or
cisco-mrms in Fig. 1) through the LISP–DDT hierarchy.
Step 3: The Map-Server forwards the Map-Request to one
of the authoritative ETR in us-site1 (us-site1-xtr1
in Fig. 1).
Step 4: Finally, the ETR (us-site1-xtr1) sends back the
Map-Reply, larger than the Map-Request, to the victim.
The attack is possible only if the following two conditions
are met (blue arrows on Fig. 1): (i) the site used as the
vector for the attack must have registered a potentially long
list of RLOCs in the LISP MDS; (ii) the LISP MDS must have
acknowledged the registration. We argue that such conditions
are easily reached if LISP is deployed at Internet scale because
of the rich connectivity among AS, however, this is left as
future work.
2) Results: In our testbed, we have configured
us-site1-xtr to register four IPv4 RLOCs (including
itself) and four IPv6 RLOCs, leading to a Map-Reply
of 214 bytes. The fact that registered RLOCs do not exist
(except us-site1-xtr) is not the problem: they will
be part of the Map-Reply with the flag Unreachable set.
Map-Request sent by the attacker are 102 Bytes long,
leading to an amplification factor of 2.09. A Python server
has been implemented on the victim for confirming the data
reception. The attacker forges crafted packets and launches
them at a given rate using a Python code developed for
querying the LISP MDS [23].3 Fig. 2 shows the effects of the
DoS attack on the victim. Our simulations last 90 seconds and
are divided into three parts: [0;30s] corresponds to the period
before the attack, [31s;90s] to the attack itself, and, finally,
[91s;120s] to the period after the attack. Those three periods
are delimited by a vertical dashed bar in Fig. 2. We performed
the attack at three levels of intensity: 10 Map-Request
per second (˜1KB/sec – blue line), 100 Map-Request per
second (˜10KB/sec – orange line), and 1,000 Map-Request
per second (˜102KB/sec – green line), that corresponds to
the maximum allowed by our testbed). Fig. 2a shows the
amount of data received, by the victim, during the attack,
respectively ˜2KB/sec, ˜21KB/sec and ˜64KB/sec in our three
scenarios. We notice that, as soon as the attack has started, the
amount of received data increases rapidly, quickly reaching
its maximum. It is worth noticing that, for low rates, the
victim receives all packets (corresponding to the theoretical
amplification factor). In contrast, for 1,000 packets/sec,
packets were lost due to our testbed’s physical limits, leading
to the oscillations observed in Fig. 2a. This figure clearly
shows how compared to the traffic generated by the attacker
3All our scripts (GNS-3 topology, victim, attack) are freely available at:
https://gitlab.com/m.gabriel/lisp-ms-ddos
(see above), the volume of traffic received by the victim is
double. Fig. 2b shows the CPU load on the victim, caused
by the attack. More precisely, the CPU load of our Python
script (running on the victim server) during the simulation,
computed as an average, moving every second, over a time
window of the last ten seconds. Fig. 2b clearly shows how
CPU load increases with the attack intensity (the higher the
attack, the higher the CPU load). All in all, Fig. 2 proofs
how an attacker can create a DoS attack by consuming
victim’s bandwidth (Fig. 2a) and wasting victim’s CPU clock
cycles (Fig. 2b).
3) Possible Mitigation Techniques: On the one hand, be-
cause at the very end the attack we showcase here remains a
DoS attack with spoofing, any mechanism able to detect DoS
attacks (e.g. [24]) and spoofing (e.g. [21], [25]) can be used.
On the other hand, LISP implementations can be made more
robust. The first and foremost protection is to enforce security
checks during Map-Request processing. More specifically,
because of the peculiar encapsulation used by LISP, only the
source address of the inner header Map-Request packets has
to be spoofed. At the same time, the outer one does not need
to be spoofed (making anti-spoofing solutions less effective).
In this way, an attacker can bypass source address filtering
very easily. However, Map-Resolvers have the possibility to
understand whether there is something wrong going on. The
simplest thing to do is to check whether inner and outer
source addresses are the same. If they are, either the request
is legitimate or both addresses are spoofed, but in the latter
case, the Map-Resolver has no way to know it. Note that the
LISP specification allows using of EID in the inner header and
RLOCs in the outer header, which leads to address mismatch.
However, in this case, a mapping must exist, proving that
actually, the inner header EID can be mapped to the outer
header RLOC. Certainly, retrieving the corresponding mapping
will generate a performance penalty; however, it will also
strongly reduce the possibility of performing the attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
The increasing interest in the locator/identifier separation
paradigm to boost the scalability of the Internet while pro-
viding undeniable benefits may as well open the possibility
of various forms of attacks. Focusing on the LISP Mapping
Distribution System we showcase how it can be abused to
carry out amplification attacks. We built GNS-3 simulated
testbed, mimicking the real LISP Beta Network, showing how
an attack can be carried out. We were able to show how an
attacker can consume two of the primary resources of a victim,
namely network bandwidth and CPU cycles.
An interesting future work will be to explore the size of
the amplification attack if locator/identifier separation is de-
ployed at Internet scale. Indeed, our proof of concept actually
consumes a very small amount of bandwidth, and does not
allow to assess the real impact at large scale. Also, in the
LISP specific case, it would be worth exploring what kind of
mechanism could be added to the protocol to make it less
easily used as an attack vector.
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